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ABSTRACT 
Visibility data (providing details about supply chain activities in e.g. production, logistics, and quality processes) 
is of highly sensitive nature – not just in the food sector, but also beyond. Amongst other things, unauthorized 
data access can be (mis)used to uncover supply chain relationships, volumes, and other business context 
information. At the same time, it becomes increasingly important to share visibility data with trading partners, 
e.g. to meet customer requirements and legal obligations. So far, it is not a trivial matter to access or even 
discover that data, which is often stored in numerous distributed databases.  
A possible means to overcome this predicament is a Discovery Service (DS), which has knowledge of the parties 
owning information about specific objects (e.g. product batches) and can provide pointers to the actual data 
sources to authorized clients while leaving no opportunity to misuse accessible data. It is important to note 
that a DS itself does not contain actual visibility data, but only references to it. Yet, even the knowledge that 
party A, B and C have information about a specific product is still sensitive as the querying client would be able 
to reveal the flow of goods and may take advantage of that knowledge. For instance, he could identify his 
supplier’s upstream vendor and, for the sake of saving costs, try to procure products directly from that 
upstream vendor rather than from his previous supplier. Hence, a DS should provide the ability to prevent such 
scenarios if it strives to achieve a high level of acceptance.  
A key enabler for a DS is a trust-inspiring means to ascertain whether a querying party is actually part of a given 
chain of custody (CoC). In conjunction with a set of rules previously defined by the respective data owners, the 
DS is then able to decide which service addresses (if at all) can be provided in the message response to the 
query client. Afterwards, the querying party can gather detailed information about a specific object by querying 
the indicated data sources. In this context, our paper addresses the following research question: How can a DS 
ascertain if and to which extent a trading partner, whether known or not, is entitled to get pointers to visibility 
data stored in distributed repositories while ensuring privacy of the data owners? 
In pursuing this research question, we first provide the relevant background including the current state of the 
art. Second, we explain and discuss the solution approach and complete our paper by outlining the solution we 
are going to realize in the course of the research project ‘FoodAuthent’ (funded by the German Ministry of 
Food and Agriculture).   
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1. Problem statement and state of the art 
Let us assume there is a supply network consisting of several raw material suppliers, manufacturers, 
distributors, logistics service providers, retailers and further parties (e.g. laboratories). For traceability 
purposes, each of these parties keeps a record of relevant events occurring to traceable objects (e.g. products, 
logistics units and assets) “… during their lifecycle, such as receiving, transforming, packing, shipping, [and] 
transporting.” (GS1 2017a, 16) In the food industry, further examples of such critical tracking events (CTEs) 
encompass harvesting, processing, and quality inspection. For illustration purposes, table 1 depicts three 
exemplary CTEs.   
Table 1. Exemplary critical tracking events in the food sector 
 
Such visibility data is useful for all members of a supply chain and for a large number of situations and use 
cases, e.g. check for compliance (based on e.g. legal or customer-specific requirements), recall management, 
meeting consumer’s information needs (e.g. by providing a subset of that data to consumer apps), or process 
optimization. Given the relevance and value of that data, trading partners in the food sector need an 
appropriate way to share it. Table 2 provides an overview of all approaches that were either designed, piloted, 
or implemented to date (for further information, please refer to GS1 2017a, p. 20 onwards).  
In the food sector, two of the listed models are prevailing so far: one step up – one step down (usually by 
exchanging bilateral EDI messages), and central repositories (e.g. as provided by traceability platforms such as 
ezTRACK, foodLogiQ, fTRACE, and Tracetracker). The first one is becoming increasingly inappropriate to fulfil 
the information requirements of various stakeholders (see e.g. Safe Food Alliance 2016; EC 2010; Eigenmann et 
al. 2012, p. 15 onwards), for instance: 
 access to visibility data beyond one tier up- and downstream (i.e. kept by supply chain parties which 
are sometimes – e.g. due to spot market procurement especially in the fresh food sector – a priori 
unknown) to enable end-to-end visibility  
 global scalability to ease integration of many, inherently distributed organizations with 
heterogeneous IT applications 
 fast data accessibility to enable prompt and effective reactions in case of supply chain issues 
 on-demand data provisioning to allow for data sharing on a need-to-know basis 
 
While central, cloud-based repositories (depending on e.g. their system architecture and service offerings) have 
the potential to meet the above mentioned requirements and feature additional merits such as lower overall 
cost, data access control management, and a higher degree of standardization (see e.g. Troeger/Alt 2017, 148 
onwards), they usually cannot share the contained visibility data with other central repositories. There are two 
major reasons for that: (a) divergent interface and data standards (e.g. as to data formats, identification 
Key Data Element CTE 1 CTE 2 CTE 3 …
Who Farmer A
(ID: GLN)
Distributor B
(ID: GLN)
Distributor B
(ID: GLN)
…
What Product lot P-1, 950 kg 
(ID: GTIN + lot number)
Product lot P-1, 400 kg 
(ID: GTIN + lot number)
and logistics unit L-2
(ID: SSCC)
Logistics unit L-2
(ID: SSCC)
…
Where Location of farmer A
(ID: GLN)
Location of Distributor B 
(ID: GLN)
Location of Distributor B
(ID: GLN)
…
When Date + Time Date + Time Date + Time …
Why  Process: Harvesting
 Lot-level master data 
(certification data, 
origin data, etc.)
 Process: Packing
 Business transaction: 
purchase order 11
 Process: Shipping
 Source: Distributor B
 Destination: Retailer C
 Business transaction: 
despatch advice 12
…
Legend: GTIN … Global Trade Item Number | GLN … Global Location Number | SSCC … Serial Shipping Container Code 
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schemes, data/vocabulary elements, etc.) and (b) the lack of an overall access control framework including a 
means to align their users’ data access policies. 
Table 2. Data sharing choreographies 
 
The first mentioned issue (a) can be addressed by leveraging global identification standards (e.g. the GTIN – 
Global Trade Item Number and the GLN – Global Location Number) and data sharing standards such as EPCIS 
along with its accompanying data standard, the Core Business Vocabulary (CBV). For detailed information, 
please refer to GS1 2018, GS1 2017c and GS1 2016.  
So far, there is no appropriate way to address the second issue (b) though. For illustration purposes, consider 
the following fictitious scenario: Company 1 submits visibility data to central repository A and agrees to share a 
defined set of data with its successors while company 2 uses central repository B and wants to share some data 
with trading partner 3, 4 and 5, who also have established a connection to repository B. There currently is no 
means for repository providers A and B to exchange data access rights, let alone keep them in sync. Thus, there 
is no possibility for e.g. trading partner 5 to access company 1’s visibility data in repository A even if it qualifies 
as one of company 1’s successors.  
Since a centralized approach in some cases entails a higher risk of data losses and attacks (aiming e.g. to access, 
delete or manipulate data in retrospect) as well as having an enhanced probability for accessibility issues (e.g. 
in case of high traffic), networked or decentralized solutions seem promising and may be chosen more 
frequently in the future. At the same time, a cumulative data sharing approach (the last available choreography 
model presented in table 2) does not fulfil several of the above-mentioned requirements and is thus not 
considered further. 
Irrespective of whether companies opt to share their visibility data following a networked, centralized or 
decentralized approach (or mix of thereof), they are confronted with the so-called discovery problem which “… 
is concerned with how to directly share data between parties that are connected in a chain but do not have a 
direct relationship.” (GS1 2017a, 36) The discovery problem comprises three elements: ‘chaining’ (determine 
whether a company is connected to another one), ‘trust’ (if chaining is confirmed, set up the conditions of trust 
required to share data with each other), and ‘data transfer’ (if trust is established, accomplish the actual data 
sharing).  
In answering the research question formulated at the beginning, this paper contributes to the first and second 
element of the discovery problem.   
2. Solution approach 
In a nutshell, our suggestion to address the ‘chaining’ and ‘trust’ issue consists of the following principles: 
Choreography 
model 
Characterization Illustration
One step up – one
step down
 Visibility data is kept in local systems
 Data exchange via bilateral messages
Centralized  Visibility data is pushed to central repository
 Data access/exchange via query interface (if 
provided)
Networked  Visibility data is kept in local systems
 Any supply chain party is enabled to query for 
data (typically depending on access rights)
Cumulative  Visibility data is systematically enhanced and 
pushed forward to subsequent supply chain 
parties in parallel to flow of goods
Decentralized and 
replicated
 Visibility data is systematically enhanced and all 
supply chain parties keep local copies of all data 
via decentralized replicated ledgers
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(1) an end user company captures visibility event data while making use of standardized identifiers, data 
structures, and data elements  
(2) an operator of an event repository sends a concise subset of these visibility data to an immutable 
ledger (distributed and shared with any party able and willing to provide visibility data) while 
obscuring any sensitive data contained in using a consistent hashing approach  
(3) a provider of a DS transfers these sanitized visibility data into a graph database and applies a globally 
harmonized data access rights framework which, in conjunction with standardized role definitions and 
data elements, serves as the basis to determine if queries for visibility event data are legitimate    
Figure 1 gives an overview of how the ‘chaining’ and ‘trust’ issue can be tackled. The picture also illustrates the 
flexibility of the suggested approach. First, it supports setups in which end user companies submit visibility data 
to cloud platforms which offer both an EPCIS repository as well as a means to provide sanitized CTEs to a 
shared ledger for access control purposes (see service providers A, B and companies 1, 2, 3). Second, it 
supports situations in which an organization (here: company 4) chooses to record visibility data in a local EPCIS 
repository while only providing corresponding sanitized datasets to a dedicated discovery service (in this case, 
provided by DS provider I). Third, it supports configurations in which a company not only holds its visibility data 
in an own EPCIS repository, but also keeps an own copy of the shared ledger (see company 5).  
Taking the example of a shipping event of company 3 (similar to CTE 3 in table 1), the entire process would 
work as follows: First, company 3 would store an EPCIS shipping event in the cloud-based EPCIS repository of 
visibility service provider B. Second, B transforms the EPCIS event into a concise, sanitized transaction only 
containing obscured, i.e. hashed object, location and party identifiers. This transaction is then submitted to an 
immutable shared ledger, which is also accessible by other parties.  
 
Figure 1. Solution approach illustration 
Now, if company 5, which is not providing its own visibility data to the repository of B, is interested in obtaining 
details of that shipping event, it queries a DS that – based on the data stored in the shared ledger – can find out 
that 5 is actually a subsequent member of the very same chain of events as 3. Given that 3 has specified that all 
successors are permitted to obtain further details of its shipping events, the DS returns the service endpoint of 
the repository containing the actual event (ideally, accompanied by an authorization token), and 5 can access 
the latter. Considering the three above-mentioned principles, the following paragraphs explain how that 
actually can be accomplished.  
Stored in decentralized EPCIS 
repositories: 
 Standardized visibility data
Stored in distributed ledgers:
 Visibility data (truncated and 
sanitized via hashing)
 Access control rules (e.g. as part of 
protocol and/or chain code)
Visibility service 
provider A
Visibility service 
provider B
Harvesting Packing
Receiving
Slaughtering Processing
Selling
Discovery service 
provider I
Company 2
Company 4
Company 5
Shipping
Inspecting
Company 1
Shipping
Processing
Company 3
Shipping
Receiving
Flow of goods
Flow of data
Critical tracking event
Legend:
Stored in graph databases:
 Relationships between visibility 
events
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2.1 Capturing visibility data in a standardized manner 
In order to ensure that visibility applications offer a high level of cost efficiency, scalability, flexibility and 
investment security, the usage of globally established standards is of paramount importance. Thus, when 
designing a visibility system, especially when modelling the respective CTEs, organizations should make use of 
standardized identifiers, vocabulary elements and data structures to the greatest possible extent. For an 
intuitive description of how to accomplish the latter, please refer to chapter 4 of GS1’s ‘EPCIS and CBV 
Implementation Guideline’ (GS1 2017c, 21 ff.). The guideline advocates an eight-step process starting from the 
collection of visibility goals/requirements and ending with the documentation of the identified visibility events 
in a visibility data matrix.  
2.2 Sanitizing and truncating visibility data for data access control purposes  
First, when providing information on visibility data to third parties for access control purposes, it is only 
required to focus on the essential data content. E.g., it is not necessary to include any quantities, instance-/lot-
level master data attributes (e.g. best before date) or user-specific extension elements. Therefore, the dataset 
only needs to contain key information on the what (i.e. object identifiers), when (timestamp of the event), 
where/who (i.e. location and party identifiers) and why (i.e. data elements providing information on the 
business context). Thus, this process is not about duplicating the actual visibility events, but stripping them 
down to their very core. As these datasets are potentially shared with many different nodes, which entails a 
growing amount of computing power and storage the bigger the individual data structures are designed, data 
economy also comes in handy from a technical perspective. In this regard, the datasets should feature a 
lightweight format (e.g. JSON or JSON-LD).   
Obviously, some elements of the datasets – especially object, party and locations IDs – cannot be stored in 
plain text. Once submitted to a shared ledger, which is accessible to many trading parties and competitors, it 
otherwise would be immediately transparent which company has bought or sold which products at which time.  
(Note that there are various ways to obtain the meaning of a given identifier. For instance, if an organization 
wants to know which company is associated with a specific GLN or GTIN, a query to the GEPIR web service 
(http://gepir.org) returns a set of corresponding master data.)  
In principle, we can choose from two basic approaches to obscure identifiers: encryption and hashing. 
Apparently, symmetric encryption is not an option: once the key is shared with a third party, there is no way to 
curtail data access at a later point of time. Further, it bears the risk that the key is leaked to parties that should 
not have access to the data in the first place. Likewise, asymmetric encryption is not a viable option either: On 
the one hand, there would be only one party (i.e. the owner of the private key) able to decrypt the content of a 
given dataset, whereas there is often the need to share visibility data with multiple parties. On the other hand, 
companies would face an enormous effort for managing the respective keys.   
Hashing however comes with a couple of inherent advantages. First of all, it is impossible to infer the original 
input string (i.e. in our case, an identifier) of a hash function. Additionally, for a given input string, the resulting 
hash value is always the same. For instance, when using SHA-256, ‘test’ always results in the following hash 
value: ‘9f86d081884c7d659a2feaa0c55ad015a3bf4f1b2b0b822cd15d6c15b0f00a08’. Even if all sensitive data is 
obscured through hashing, it helps to address both the ‘chaining’ as well as the ‘trust’ challenge of the 
discovery problem: ‘Chaining’ can be achieved independently of whether the identifiers are represented in 
plain text or whether they are hashed. What is more, it helps to build ‘trust’ as the identity of the data 
submitter cannot be disclosed and the hash of a specific product identifier can only be created by parties 
having knowledge of it (e.g. a specific GTIN + serial number).  
A particular case is the hashing of the party and location IDs (i.e. GLNs), which in contrast to the object IDs (e.g. 
GTIN + serial number, GTIN + lot number, and SSCC) remain static. If companies would hash GLNs just once, 
querying parties could map a specific hash value to a given GLN and reveal sensitive business information. This 
is why we suggest at least a dual hashing for party and location IDs.  
For location or party IDs as part of the ‘why’ dimension of a visibility event (e.g. source and destination in an 
EPCIS shipping or receiving event), we suggest organizations to use the respective ID of a previously agreed 
business transaction type (for instance, invoice, purchase, or despatch advise) in conjunction with the GLNs. As 
a specific business transaction ID is typically just known by a company and its immediate up- and downstream 
trading partners, only direct senders or recipients of goods can generate the twofold hash value indicating 
source or destination. For efficiency and process reliability purposes, the applied business transaction type 
should be indicated in the sanitized visibility dataset (of course, not the ID itself, though).  
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For location IDs as part of the ‘where’ dimension of visibility events (in EPCIS, read point and business location), 
we suggest data owners to keep a table containing an (internal) GLN masking code with an appropriate validity 
period (whose definitions are solely at the discretion of the data owner, see table 3). Further, if data owners 
wish that their identities were impossible to deduce, they should also keep a table indexing all submitted 
sanitized visibility datasets with a simple counter. In obscuring the actual GLN, it first hashes this counter value, 
the GLN as well as the GLN masking code and eventually hashes the resulting concatenated string.  
Table 3. GLN masking code table for obscuring GLNs 
Begin of validity period (DateTime) End of validity period (DateTime) GLN masking code (String) 
… … … 
2018-02-05T00:00:00.000+01:00 2018-02-11T23:59:59.999+01:00 1.FCK03l# 
2018-02-12T00:00:00.000+01:00 2018-02-18T23:59:59.999+01:00 G3issb0c# 
… … … 
It is important to note that the same procedure is applicable whenever a use case requires an organization to 
proof that it e.g. actually was/is a legitimate owner of a specific product (i.e. is able to re-create the hash 
value). For that purpose, the company just has to look up the GLN masking code valid at the event time of 
concern as well as the respective counter value. Taking the example of GLN masking code ‘1.FCK03l#’ and 
counter value ‘1’ to obscure the GLN populating the read point as well as business transaction identifier 
‘urn:epc:id:gdti:4012345.12564.12’ to obscure the GLNs populating source and destinations, table 5 contains 
exemplary computations.  
To cater for flexibility for other hashing functions and to give a querying client a clear indication of the hashing 
function to be performed (e.g. for proofing the legitimacy of a request), the used hashing algorithm should be 
specified. In this regard, various solution approaches for hash URI notations have been discussed so far. For 
one, Thiemann (2003) suggests a URN-based URI, which however requires a registration with IANA, which has 
not taken place yet (IANA 2017). Another approach, suggested by Leonard (2015), is a URI syntax prefixed with 
the specific hashing algorithm name (e.g. ‘sha256’). Similar to the first one, the respective URI schemes are not 
yet registered with IANA.  
In contrast, the URI scheme as specified in RFC 6920 (‘Naming things with Hashes’) is already registered with 
IANA (IANA 2018). The authors of RFC 6920 propose “…a new URI scheme for this purpose (…) [and] a way to 
map these to HTTP URLs, and binary and human-speakable formats (…)” (Farrell et al. 2013). Thereby, the 
‘Named Information’ (ni) URI consists of nine elements: the scheme name (‘ni’), colon and two slashes (‘://’), an 
optional authority, slash (‘/’), digest algorithm (e.g. ‘sha-256’), separator (‘;’), digest value, query parameter 
separator (‘?’, if applicable), and optional query parameters. As the ni URI scheme is officially available and 
based on an Internet Standard approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group, this paper 
follows that approach. 
The only information that needs to be added to the sanitized visibility dataset is a reference to the source of 
the actual visibility event, so that a DS is able to provide a pointer indicating where to query for it. Again, due to 
privacy reasons, that information should not be included in plain text (e.g. if a data set contained the actual 
service endpoints such as https://query-service.epcis.henkel.de or https://epcis-query-service.eztrack.com, it 
obviously is quite easy inferring the parties involved or at least narrowing down the geographic region of the 
data submitters).  
What is more, data providers should have the flexibility to change their respective service endpoints as they 
see fit. For this purpose we suggest, quite similar to the above-introduced dual GLN hashing, to obscure the 
service endpoint by hashing the service URL in conjunction with an interface masking code and to synchronize 
the contents of that mapping table (see table 4, without the internal interface masking code) with the 
respective DS provider(s). In an analogous way to the GLN masking code, the interface masking code should 
change in appropriate frequency, so that there only remains a negligible risk for data abuse.   
Table 4. Interface masking code table for obscuring interface IDs 
Hash value (String) 
(abridged here) 
Interface masking 
code (String) 
Start of validity period 
(DateTime) 
End of validity period 
(DateTime) 
Service endpoint 
(String) 
… … … … … 
ni:///sha-256; 
1a2b(…) 
Koe1nerD*m 2018-02-05 
T00:00:00.000+01:00 
2018-02-06 
T23:59:59.999+01:00 
https://epcis-
query.ftrace.com 
ni:///sha-256; 
9b8c(…) 
Koe11eA~af! 2018-02-07 
T00:00:00.000+01:00 
2018-02-08 
T23:59:59.999+01:00 
https://epcis-
query.ftrace.com 
… … … … … 
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Putting it together, table 5 illustrates how a CTE is captured as an EPCIS-based visibility event (while making use 
of globally standardized identification schemes and data elements) and how that visibility event in turn is 
converted into a sanitized visibility dataset ready to be shared via immutable ledgers set up for data 
discovery/access control purposes.  
Although the visibility data is truncated and sanitized, it still enables a number of compelling use cases such as 
ensuring completeness of the chain of custody, validating product authenticity, proving legitimate possession 
of a specific asset, and performing plausibility checks. When stored on a shared ledger (e.g. based on 
blockchain technology), all these use cases still work even if the original data owner has gone out of business or 
has lost the actual visibility events.   
Table 5. Converting CTEs into sanitized EPCIS events 
 
2.3 Applying a globally harmonized data access rights framework 
To date, recording data on distributed ledgers does not allow indicating any relationships between such 
sanitized visibility event datasets. Therefore, they need to be stored in a more appropriate manner. A suitable 
option is a graph database that can link logically connected events (e.g., those which share the same object 
identifier) and sort them into correct time order. In conjunction with previously agreed roles, an accessing 
application then can determine the exact relationship of various events. For scalability reasons, organizations 
should make use of globally standardized role definitions. As the latter are not available yet, table 6 gives a first 
idea how a globally harmonized role concept could look like.  
Table 6. Conceptual design of globally aligned roles 
Role of requesting 
party 
Criteria for requesting party Example (see 
figure 2) 
Successor Has captured an event with the same instance-/lot-level identifier (possibly (dis)aggregated 
and/or transformed further downstream) and a higher event time value 
C, D 
Predecessor Has captured an event with the same instance-/lot-level identifier (possibly (dis)aggregated 
and/or transformed further upstream) and a lower event time value 
A 
Direct successor Similar to successor, but requiring an event with an identical read point or destination ID as 
indicated in the shipping event’s destination list captured by the event owner  
C 
Direct predecessor Similar to successor, but requiring an event with an identical read point or source ID as indicated 
in the receiving event’s source list captured by the event owner  
A 
Chain member 
 
Any of the above A, C, D 
Third party 
organization 
Specific ID of e.g. a brand owner, authority, etc. (e.g.) E 
Figure 2 displays a simple chain of events captured by various trading partners. Taking the example of a query 
request for the transformation event captured by processor B (highlighted in dark grey), it helps to understand 
the role concept introduced above. In this particular instance, farmer A would qualify as B’s predecessor as he 
has made the very product (‘GTIN + lot 123’) consumed by processor B. At the same time, farmer A also is B’s 
direct predecessor since B appears in the destination list of the related shipping event (and vice versa). 
Similarly, retailer D qualifies as successor, but not as a direct one.  
Critical Tracking Event Resulting EPCIS Event Sanitized EPCIS Event (draft)
Who/Where
Distributor B, plant 123
(e.g. GLN ‘4012345000054’)
…
<EventList>
<ObjectEvent>
<eventTime>2018-02-07T15:00:00.000+01:00</eventTime>
<eventTimeZoneOffset>+01:00</eventTimeZoneOffset>
<epcList>
<epc>urn:epc:id:sscc:4012345.0666666666</epc>
</epcList>
<action>OBSERVE</action>
<bizStep>urn:epcglobal:cbv:bizstep:shipping</bizStep>
<readPoint>
<id>urn:epc:id:sgln:4012345.00005.0</id>
</readPoint>
<bizTransactionList>
<bizTransaction type="urn:epcglobal:cbv:btt:desadv">
urn:epc:id:gdti:4012345.12564.12</bizTransaction>
</bizTransactionList>
<extension>
<sourceList>
<source 
type="urn:epcglobal:cbv:sdt:possessing_party">
urn:epc:id:sgln:4012345.00000.0</source>
</sourceList>
<destinationList>
<destination
type="urn:epcglobal:cbv:sdt:possessing_party">
urn:epc:id:sgln:4023333.00000.0</destination>
</destinationList>
</extension>
</ObjectEvent>
</EventList>
…
…
{
"objectEvent": {
"eventTime": "2018-02-07T15:00:00.000+01:00",
"epcs": {
"id": "ni:///sha-256;7a817e8819881b9a5fb7117f94764e
63c31160633a549ca064b69621b59461fc"
},
"action": "OBSERVE",
"bizStep": "urn:epcglobal:cbv:bizstep:shipping",
"readPoint": "ni:///sha-256;2bb4fbdeb9b8d1466b0a912b9
318473df499e2a49921ddf068cd1cbf2853449b",
"sources": {
"id": "ni:///sha-256;a89cabda0db3d76c1339ec6591e077
4857b40623ecc5f3d2dbd69cd85c9fabbe"
},
"destinations": {
"id": "ni:///sha-256;1ba5958d76ebf4a6e9c1db34673386
1377b402e2084387cde11113b26566498e"
},
"linkingBTT": "urn:epcglobal:cbv:btt:desadv",
"interfaceID": "ni:///sha-256;f6d36b401b4e7458700ba25
290947f46816603ffb6f659bdd53f01e15c9ab1e7"
}
}
…
What
Logistics unit (e.g. SSCC 
‘040123456666666665‘)
When
Date + Time (e.g. 7th February 2018, 
16:00 CET)
Why
Process: Shipping
Source: Distributor B (e.g. GLN 
‘4012345000009‘)
Destination: Retailer C (e.g. GLN 
‘4023333000000‘)
Business transaction (e.g. despatch
advice ’12’)
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Given B specified that a direct successor is allowed to obtain further details of its transformation events, 
distributor C is permitted to do so, but no one else. Likewise, if farmer A defined that all successors in the 
supply chain are entitled to see data of its harvesting events, distributor C and retailer D can query for them, 
without farmer A even need to know them in advance. 
 
Figure 2. Exemplary chain of visibility events to illustrate the conceptual role design 
Such data access rules are expressible in a vendor-independent, globally applicable manner as soon as the 
above-mentioned standardized role framework is available. Based on that, organizations can define who is 
entitled to obtain knowledge that they have data on specific products in the first place (i.e. get the query 
service endpoint to the actual visibility data).  
In doing so, they can also confine the event profiles (e.g. harvesting, shipping, transforming, etc.) they generally 
are willing to share with a given supply chain role (see table 7). These data access definitions need to be shared 
through the immutable ledger as well, so that each DS provider can answer to information requests in a 
consistent and trustworthy manner.  
Table 7.  Data access framework 
Event profile 
Supply chain role 
Successor Predecessor Direct successor … 
Transforming   x x x  
Packing   x  
Shipping x  x  
…     
In a modified version, the same framework is also applicable for more fine-granular access control decisions 
when an external accessing application queries for actual visibility data in someone’s EPCIS repository. Thereby, 
table 7 just needs to be extended with the attributes present in the respective event profiles. For instance, a 
company can define that a successor can access all the transformation events the successor is chained to, 
except for detailed quantity data and any business transaction IDs.    
3. Outlook and Future Challenges 
In the research project ‘FoodAuthent’, there are several use cases requiring a data access framework as 
described in the previous paragraphs. Particularly, the project aims to enable various stakeholders in the food 
sector to access visibility events captured by governmental or commercial food laboratories, e.g.: (a) inquire 
whether a specific product lot was checked for authenticity, (b) inquire details of an authenticity analysis, and 
(c) validate that files containing relevant information for authenticity checks are genuine.     
This will entail a number of tangible benefits for organizations in the food sector. Amongst other things, (a) will 
enable organizations to embed that data in their respective business or consumer-facing applications (e.g. a 
mobile app for product information). Secondly, (b) has the potential to increase efficiency of food laboratories 
as it paths the way for enhanced collaboration between commercial, academic and authoritative food 
laboratories. Finally, (c) will enhance confidence and reliability in product authenticity operations.   
In the course of the prototypical implementation, we will further refine the solution approach and investigate 
its feasibility, scalability, and limitations. For instance, it may be required to extend the sanitized event datasets 
Harvesting
 2018-02-06, 08:00 CET
 GTIN + Lot 123
 readPoint: A
Authority E
Shipping
 2018-02-06, 11:00 CET
 GTIN + Lot 123
 readPoint: A
 Destination: B
Farmer A
Receiving
 2018-02-07, 07:30 CET
 GTIN + Lot 123
 readPoint: B
 Source: A
Transforming
 2018-02-07, 14:30 CET
 Input: GTIN + Lot 123
 Output: GTIN + Lot 987
 readPoint: B
Packing
 2018-02-08, 10:30 CET
 Child: GTIN + Lot 123
 Parent: SSCC 55555
 readPoint: C
Processor B
Shipping
 2018-02-07, 17:00 CET
 GTIN + Lot 987
 readPoint: B
 Destination: C
Distributor C
Receiving
 2018-02-08, 05:45 CET
 GTIN + Lot 987
 readPoint: C
 Source: B
Shipping
 2018-02-08, 14:00 CET
 SSCC 55555
 readPoint: C
 Destination: D
Retailer D
Receiving
 2018-02-08, 17:50 CET
 SSCC 55555
 readPoint: D
 Source: C
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to ease data discovery. In addition to that, we expect a number of technical challenges (e.g. scalability of the 
graph database) we need to address. Furthermore, we will investigate mechanisms to prevent illegitimate 
operations (e.g. the submission of a sanitized visibility event to pretend to be a specific role for fraudulently 
obtaining access to data). Finally, yet importantly, we will develop a DS operator model (i.e. appropriate 
provider(s), organizational and technical set-up, and the actual provision of data), which is linked to the third 
element of the ‘discovery problem’ mentioned at the outset of our paper.  
The access control mechanism as addressed in this paper will be an important element of the overall 
FoodAuthent framework, which consist of legal (e.g. terms of use), organizational (e.g. preconditions for 
participating organizations) and technical (e.g. data and interface standards) components.  
Acknowledgement 
We would like to take the opportunity to thank the German Ministry of Food and Agriculture for funding our 
project as part of its program on facilitating innovation based on a decision by the Parliament of the Federal 
Republic of Germany. Apart from GS1 Germany, the partners of the project ‘FoodAuthent’ are Benelog, the 
German Federal Institute for Risk Assessment (BfR), Eurofins Analytics, Lablicate, and the Department of 
Computer and Information Science at the University of Konstanz. The three-year project is set up until 
September 2019. For further information, please refer to the project’s website (https://www.foodauthent.de/).  
References 
Eigenmann, R.; Vucic, N.; Dillinger, M.; Viola, K.; Meyer, F.; Quesada Pimentel, D., Verhoosel, J.; Kaloxylos, A.; 
Lampropoulou, I.; István Gábor, I.; Perea Escribano, C.; Sundmaeker, H. (2012) [Eigenmann et al. 
2012]: Inventory of future capabilities of internet to meet future long and short term needs of the 
food sector, available at: 
http://cordis.europa.eu/docs/projects/cnect/6/285326/080/deliverables/001-
SAFD70022V011Final.pdf (August 2017).  
European Commission (2010) [EC 2010]: Guidance on the implementation of articles 11, 12, 14, 17, 18, 19 and 
20 of Regulation (EC) N° 178/2002 on general food law, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/food/safety/ general_food_law/general_requirements_en (September 2017). 
Farrell, S.; Kutscher, D.; Dannewitz, C.; Ohlman, B.; Keranen, A.; Hallam-Baker, P. (2013) [Farrell et al. 2013]: 
RFC 6920. Naming Things with Hashes, available at: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6920 (February 
2018). 
GS1 (2018) [GS1 2018]: GS1 General Specifications. The foundational GS1 standard that defines how 
identification keys, data attributes and barcodes must be used in business applications, release 18, 
available at: https://www.gs1.org/barcodes-epcrfid-id-keys/gs1-general-specifications (January 
2018). 
GS1 (2017) [GS1 2017a]: GS1 Global Traceability Standard. GS1’s framework for the design of interoperable 
traceability systems for supply chains, release 2.0, available at: 
https://www.gs1.org/traceability/traceability/latest (September 2017). 
GS1 (2017) [GS1 2017b]: GS1, IBM and Microsoft announce collaboration to leverage GS1 standards in 
enterprise blockchain applications, available at: https://www.gs1.org/articles/2256/blockchain-gs1-
ibm-and-microsoft-collaborate-leverage-standards (September 2017). 
GS1 (2017) [GS1 2017c]: Core Business Vocabulary Standard. Specifies the structure of vocabularies and specific 
values for the vocabulary elements to be utilised in conjunction with the GS1 EPCIS standard, release 
1.2.2, available at: https://www.gs1.org/epcis (October 2017). 
GS1 (2016) [GS1 2016]: EPS Information Services (EPCIS) Standard. Enables disparate applications to create and 
share visibility event data, both within and across enterprises, release 1.2, available at: 
https://www.gs1.org/epcis (October 2017). 
IANA (2017) [IANA 2017]: Uniform Resource Names (URN) Namespaces, available at: 
https://www.iana.org/assignments/urn-namespaces/urn-namespaces.xhtml (November 2017).  
IANA (2018) [IANA 2018]: Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) Schemes, available at: 
https://www.iana.org/assignments/uri-schemes/uri-schemes.xml (February 2018).  
Leonard, S. (2015) [Leonard 2015]: URI schemes for SHA-1 and SHA-256. Internet-Draft, available at: 
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-seantek-sha-uris-00 (November 2017). 
Safe Food Alliance (2016) [Safe Food Alliance 2016]: Traceability – fundamental requirements and the FSMA 
mandate, available at: https://safefoodalliance.com/newsletter/2016-01/traceability-fundamental-
requirements-and-the-fsma-mandate (August 2017). 
Tröger et al. / Proceedings in System Dynamics and Innovation in Food Networks 2018, 231-240 
240 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18461/pfsd.2018.1817 
Thiemann, P. (2003) [Thiemann 2003]: A URN namespace for identifiers based on cryptographic hashes. 
Internet-Draft, available at: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thiemann-hash-urn-01 (November 2017). 
Tröger, R.; Alt, R. (2017) [Tröger/Alt 2017]: Design options for supply chain visibility services: learnings from 
three EPCIS implementations, Electronic Markets, vol. 27, issue 2. 
Tröger, R.; Reiche, R.; Schiefer, G. (2013) [Tröger et al. 2013]: Benefits through utilizing EPC network 
components in service-oriented environments – an analysis using the example of the food industry. In: 
International Journal on Food Systems Dynamics, Special issue: food systems transparency and the 
future internet, vol. 4, no. 4. 
